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Abstract
This study addresses primal-dual dynamics for a stochastic programming problem for capacity network design.
It is proven that consensus can be achieved on the here and now variables which represent the capacity of the net-
work. The main contribution is a heuristic approach which involves the formulation of the problem as a mean-field
game. Every agent in the mean-field game has control over its own primal-dual dynamics and seeks consensus with
neighboring agents according to a communication topology. We obtain theoretical results concerning the existence of
a mean-field equilibrium. Moreover, we prove that the consensus dynamics converge such that the agents agree on
the capacity of their respective micro-networks. Lastly, we emphasize how penalties on control and state influence the
dynamics of agents in the mean-field game.
Keywords Mean field games, Primal-dual dynamics, Stochastic Programming, Network optimization.
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1 Introduction
This work focuses on primal-dual dynamics for a stochastic programming problem related to network capacity design.
Demand is extracted from sink nodes and goods flow over the edges. Edges are subject to capacity constraints and
flow conservation constraints, implying that assigned capacity cannot be exceeded and that the network should comply
to demand being extracted from sink nodes, respectively [6, 26]. The setup fits a broad range of application cases
such as communications network optimization, supply chain network optimization, energy resource allocation, (cyber-
physical) smart grids, and stock-market pricing [2, 8, 13, 14, 18, 19, 24, 30]. The call for more efficient supply chain
logistics with an ever-growing culture of online ordering in addition to the upcoming era of the physical internet
explains the relevance for this study [21, 22]. Also, the current issues with climate change and Earth resource depletion
again stress the need for efficient logistics [16, 25].
Recent works have been dedicated to stability analysis of primal-dual dynamics with non-strong convexity issues
where is proven that under specific conditions, the primal-dual dynamics are globally exponentially stable [9, 20].
Furthermore, analysis on robustness has been performed in [12, 17, 23], where the robustness of stability of the primal-
dual dynamics is analyzed and performance guarantees are provided for different primal-dual systems, such as power
systems. Also, the global/local nature of the convexity-concavity properties of the primal-dual dynamics was examined.
Explicit attention has been paid to asymptotic stability properties of the primal-dual dynamics in [10, 11, 13, 26]. In
these works, the well-known phenomena of Lyapunov functions and the invariance principle by LaSalle are used to
conduct stability analyses.
There is less work dedicated to the combination of primal-dual dynamics with mean-field games. However, there
have been studies concerning mean-field games applied on a primal-dual problem, such as in [1], where a planning
problem is discussed. Additionally, in [28] and [29] Lagrangian relaxation is used in mean-field game power control.
The main contribution is a heuristic approach which involves the reformulation of the original problem into a large
number of stochastic primal-dual dynamics which are coupled in the same spirit as in mean-field games. To be more
specific, we consider the instance of a large number of players, each assigned with a primal-dual dynamics subject
to a specific realization of the demand. The players of the mean-field game have to obtain consensus over the here
and now decision variables: the capacity of each edge of the supply chain network. We also consider wait and see
decision variables for flow and the Lagrange multipliers coming from the primal-dual dynamics. Note the analogy
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with a two-player zero-sum game whereby the first player, the minimizer, sets the here and now variables required to
accommodate for any potential scenario concerning flow and demand realization. Subsequently, the second player,
the maximizer, sets the wait and see variables to maximize demand satisfaction given the decision of player 1 and the
realized demand. The condition for convergence to a consensus value is that the communication network of agents
needs to be connected, i.e., for any pair of nodes there exists a path connecting them. We first transform the primal-
dual dynamics into a mean-field game, after which theoretical results are provided concerning a mean-field equilibrium
solution in the same spirit as in [2–4]. Lastly, we provide numerical simulations to prove once again that consensus is
obtained. Since the proposed methodology is heuristic in nature, the convergence values are in general sub-optimal.
We wish to stress that though the obtained mean-field game has a classic structure, the game is obtained via an
original methodology. The methodology involves turning the micro-network model into a set of primal-dual dynamics
and after that into a mean-field game in which each agent faces a different realization of the uncertain demandω . We see
this as a value and believe that the link between primal-dual dynamics and mean-field games expands the significance,
meaning, and potential of mean-field games approaches beyond the ones already in the literature. Note also that the
obtained mean-field game depends strongly on the micro-network optimization parameters. Actually the incidence
matrix, the penalty coefficients and the uncertain demand enter into the mean-field dynamics of the optimization flow
and capacity variables as well as of the Lagrange multipliers.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the stochastic programming for network design. In
Section 3, we present the primal-dual dynamics. In Section 4, present the corresponding mean-field game. In Section 5,
we state theoretical results on mean-field equilibrium and convergence. In Section 6, we provide a simulation example
to corroborate our results. Lastly, in Section 7, we provide concluding remarks and discuss future works.
2 Stochastic programming for network design
Consider a two-layer network as in Fig. 1. Layer 1 involves the communication topology (henceforth referred to
as macro-network) denoted as Gˆ(Vˆ , Eˆ) whereas layer 2 comprises the physical flow network (henceforth referred
to as micro-network) denoted as G(V,E). We first define the micro-network as follows. Let the set of nodes be
V ∈ {V1,V2, . . . ,Vn}. Parameter n denotes the number of nodes present in the network. Let the set of edges be E ∈
{E1,E2, . . . ,Em}. Parameter m denotes the number of edges in the network. Demand ω pulling from sink nodes is
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Figure 1: Two-layer network: macro-network Gˆ(Vˆ , Eˆ) in layer 1 and micro-network G(V,E) in layer 2.
described by a vector ω ∈ Rn×1. Capacity of the edges are the here and now variables and are denoted by c ∈ Rm×1.
The transported goods in each edge are the wait and see variables and are denoted by u ∈ Rm×1 denotes . A graphical
representation of the micro-network can be found in Fig. 2.
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Figure 2: A graphical representation of the directed network corresponding to the first problem instance.
Now consider that all demand should always be fulfilled and backlog is discouraged in the system. Logically, the
amount of transported goods cannot exceed the capacity for respective edges. The deterministic version of the problem
we wish to solve involves the minimization over the flow u and capacity c of the edges and can be formulated as:
min f1(c)+ f2(u)
s.t. B˜u = ω,
u≤ c,
u,c > 0,
(1)
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where B˜ ∈ Rn×m is the incidence matrix of the micro-network. In the optimization problem, we let f1(c) = 12 cT Q˜1c+
f˜ T1 c, and analogously, f2(u) =
1
2 u
T Q˜2u+ f˜ T2 u. Lastly, let us define Q˜1, Q˜2 ∈ Rm×m.
Under the assumption that ω is an uncertain random parameter, we may model this problem as a two-stage stochas-
tic program as follows:
min f1(c)+Eω Qˆ(u,ω)
s.t. B˜u = ω,
u≤ c,
u,c > 0.
(2)
Here, Eω(.) denotes expectation with respect to ω and Qˆ(u,ω) denotes the sub-optimal value of the second-stage
problem, namely
Qˆ(u,ω) := min
u
{ f2(u)|Bu = ω}.
3 Primal-dual dynamics
From the Lagrangian and, after rearranging, we obtain:
L (u,c,λ ,µ)
= f1(c)+λT (B˜u−ω)+µT (u− c)+E f2(u)
= f1(c)+
[
B˜Tλ +µ
]T
u−µT c−λTω+E f2(u)
= f1(c)+

 I
−I
µ+
B˜T
0
λ

T u
c
−ωTλ +E f2(u),
where µ ∈ Rm×1 and λ ∈ Rn×1 are the Lagrange multipliers.
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The Lagrange dual function can then be specified as follows:
inf
u,c
{
f1(c)+

 I
−I
µ+
B˜T
0
λ

T u
c
−ωTλ +E f2(u)}.
For a solution in nonlinear programming to be optimal, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions must hold, which
we specify next: ∇u f2(u)
∇c f1(c)
+
 I
−I
µ+
B˜T
0
λ = 0. (3)
The gradient of the Lagrangian with respect to u and c vanishes, which therefore results in the following KKT condi-
tions: 
µ+ B˜Tλ +∇u f2(u) = 0,
∇c f1(c)−µ = 0.
(4)
We formulate the primal-dual dynamics according to gradient descent and gradient ascent for convex and concave
variables, respectively: 
u˙ =
[
−∇uL
]
+
=
[
∇u f2(u)− Iµ− B˜Tλ
]
+
=
[
µ− B˜Tλ − Q˜2u− f˜2
]
+
c˙ =
[
−∇cL
]
+
=
[
∇u f1(c)− (−I)µ
]
+
=
[
−Q˜1c− f˜1+µ
]
+
λ˙ =+∇λL = B˜u−ω
µ˙ =
[
+∇µL u− c
]
+
(5)
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In compact vector form, the system can be written as

u˙
c˙
λ˙
µ˙

=

−Q˜2 0 −B˜T −I
0 −Q˜1 0 I
B 0 0 0
I −I 0 0


u
c
λ
µ

+

− f˜2
− f˜1
−ω
0

∈ Rm+×Rm+×Rn×Rm+.
(6)
As previously explained, we would like to obtain consensus regarding the capacity of edges of the connected undirected
graph G = (V,E) defined earlier. This is possible formulating the problem as a mean-field game as explained next.
4 Construction of the Mean-Field Game
Consider p populations such that each player of our game belongs to a population k ∈ {1, . . . , p}. The generic player of
population k is characterized by its state x(t) ∈ R3m+n at time t for a given time horizon window [0,T ] which evolves
according to (6) under the control variable vk. In particular,

u˙
c˙
λ˙
µ˙

︸︷︷︸
x˙
=

−Q˜2 0 −B˜T −I
0 −Q˜1 0 I
B˜ 0 0 0
I −I 0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A

u
c
λ
µ

︸︷︷︸
x
+

− f˜2
− f˜1
−ω
0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
+

0 . . . . . . 0
... 1 . . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . . . . 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
vk.
(7)
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Note that (7) can be written in compact form as x˙ = Ax+Bvk +C =: f (x,vk). Note that x is the state vector of the
system that involves also the decision variables of our original stochastic programming problem.
Now let us consider a probability density function that describes the density of the players of a population in
state x at time t, mk(x, t), with the property
∫
R3m+n mk(x, t)dx = 1. Then the mean states can be computed following
mk(t) =
∫
R3m+n xmk(x, t)dx.
To describe the interaction between populations, let us associate population k with agent k. Then we can introduce
an interaction topology between agents, say Gˆ = {Vˆ , Eˆ}, and we can define the neighbors of an agent k in Gˆ as:
N(k) =
{
j ∈ Vˆ | (k, j) ∈ Eˆ} .
We define a player’s objective in population k based on the aggregate kth state as:
ρk =
∑ j∈N(k)m j
|N(k)| . (8)
Here, |N(k)| denotes the cardinality of neighbor set k. Let us now consider a running cost function g(x,ρk,v) and a
terminal cost function ψ(ρk,x), which are defined as follows:
g(x,ρk,v) =
1
2
(ρk− x)T Q(ρk− x)+ 12v
T Rv,
ψ(ρk,x) =
1
2
S(ρk− x)2.
The first term in the expression for g assigns a penalty to the state deviating from mean ρk. The second term assigns a
penalty on control. Q, S and R are diagonal matrices of compatible dimensions.
Every player in population k wishes to solve the following problem:
min
v(·)
E
∫ T
0
[g(x,ρk,v)]dt+ψ(ρk(T ),X(T )) (9)
subject to
x˙ = Ax+Bv+C.
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For every population k, denote the value of the robust optimization problem starting at time t and state x by σk(x, t).
This results in the following mean-field game in σk(x, t) and mk(x, t):
∂tσk(x, t)+
{
f (x,v∗)T∂xσk(x, t)+g(x,ρk,v∗)
}
= 0,
σk(x,T ) = ψ(ρk(T ),x),
∂tmk(x, t)+div(mk(x, t) f (·)) = 0,
mk(x,0) = mk0(x).
(10)
Any solution of (10) is referred to as the mean-field equilibrium, which provides the sub-optimal values for the wait
and see variables. Note that the second and fourth equation from (10) are the boundary conditions, while the third
equation is the advection equation.
The optimal time-varying state-feedback control can be computed for every single agent in population k and is
given by:
v∗k(x, t) ∈ argminv
{
(Ax+Bv+C)T∂xσk(x, t)
+g(x,ρk(t),v)
}
.
(11)
In this expression, note that the Hamiltonian appears as the argument of the minimizer.
5 Mean-field equilibrium and convergence
In this section, we obtain an expression for the mean-field control and provide results for the mean-field equilibrium
dynamics.
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Lemma 1 The robust mean-field game takes the form:

∂tσk(x, t)− 12 (∂xσk(x, t))T
[
BR−1BT
]
∂xσk(x, t)
+(∂xσk(x, t))T (Ax+C)
+ 12 (ρk− x)T Q(ρk− x) = 0
σk(x,T ) = ψ(ρk(T ),x)
∂tmk(x, t)
+∂x
[
mk(x, t)(Ax−BR−1BT∂xσk(x, t)+C)
]
= 0
mk(x,0) = mk0(x)
mk :=
∫
R xmkdx
(12)
Additionally, the optimal control is:
v∗k =−R−1BT∂xσk(x, t). (13)
In this set of equations, the first equation corresponds to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation, and the third equation
corresponds to the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation. The proof of Lemma 5.1 can be found in Appendix A.
We assume that the time evolution of the common state is known and, subsequently, investigate the solution of the
Hamilton-Jacobi equation. Consider the following problem with known ρk:
min
v(·)
E
∫ T
0
[g(X(t),ρk(t),v(t))]dt (14)
where
x˙ = Ax+Bv+C.
The next theoretical result presents the mean-field equilibrium control. In preparation to that, let us consider a prob-
ability density function that describes the density of the players of a population in state c at time t, mk(c, t), with the
property
∫
Rm mk(c, t)dc = 1. Then the mean states can be computed following m
c
k(t) =
∫
Rm cmk(c, t)dc.
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We define a player’s objective in population k based on the aggregate kth state as:
ρck =
∑ j∈N(k)mcj
|N(k)| . (15)
In the following, given a generic matrix A ∈ R(3m+n)×(3m+n) we denote by Ac ∈ Rm the matrix obtained extracting
the rows and columns associated with the only variables c ∈ Rm×m. In addition, we consider the following value
function:
σk(x, t) =
1
2
xTΦ(t)x+H(t)T x+χ(t). (16)
and denote
Z˜ :=
[
AT −2ΦBR−1BT ]−1 .
Theorem 1 A mean-field equilibrium for the dynamics of (12) is obtained from the following set of equations:

σk(x, t) = 12 x
TΦ(t)x+H(t)T x+χ(t),
m˙k(t) =
[
A−BR−1BTΦ(t)]mk(t)
−BR−1BT H(t)+C,
(17)
where 
Φ˙(t)+ATΦ(t)+ΦT
[−BR−1BT ]Φ(t)+Q = 0
∈ [0,T [, Φ(T ) = S,
H˙(t)−2Φ(t)BR−1BT H(t)+AT H(t)
+Φ(t)TC−Qρk(t) = 0 ∈ [0,T [,
h(T ) =−Sρk(T ),
χ˙+H(t)T
[
BR−1BT
]
H(t)+H(t)TC
+
1
2
ρk(t)T Qρk(t) ∈ [0,T [, χ(T ) = 12ρ
T
k (T )Sρk(T ).
(18)
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Additionally, the mean-field equilibrium control is:
v∗k =−R−1BT (Φ(t)T x+H(t)). (19)
Furthermore, for infinite time horizon T → ∞, and for all aggregate states mc = (mc1,mc2, . . . ,mcp), we have the
following consensus-type dynamics:
m˙c =−Q˜1mc(t)−Lmc(t)+δ . (20)
where, Q˜1 := diag(Q˜1) (diagonal matrix with block entry Q˜1), δ := R−1c
(
Z˜cΦTc µ+(−Z˜cQc−ΦTc )ρkc
)
+(µ− f˜1) and
L is defined as the graph-Laplacian matrix where the k jth entry is the block matrix:
Lk j =

R−1c ΦTc j = k,
1
|N(k)|R
−1
c ΦTc j 6= k, j ∈ N(k),
0 otherwise.
(21)
This result is relevant since we can solve (17) in closed form and we show that consensus is ultimately achieved among
agents. The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix B. As mentioned previously, the proposed methodology is
heuristic in nature, and therefore the convergence values are in general sub-optimal.
6 Simulation Example
We are considering a scale-free network with p = 1000, implying that the network consists of 1000 players. Players
only consider the mean-field computed over its neighbors according to the expression of (15). Furthermore, we generate
stochastic demand according to the normal distribution at every time instance for the sink nodes of the micro-networks.
This makes the constant term vector C change over time since ω is now renewed every time instance. Prior to the
simulation, we parametrize the system as follows:
ω =
[
0 0 23 7 0 0
]T
, Q˜1 = I9×9,
12
Q˜2 = I9×9, f˜1 =
[
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
]T
,
f˜2 =
[
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
]T
,
C =
[
− f˜2 − f˜1 −ω O9×1
]T
, B =

O9×1
19×1
O15×1
 ,
BI =

1 0 −1 −1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 −1 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 −1

,
A =

−Q˜2 O9×9 −BTI −I9×9
O9×9 −Q˜1 O9×6 I9×9
BI O6×9 O6×6 O6×9
I9×9 −I9×9 O9×6 O9×9

,
R = 1, Q ∈ R33×33 =

O9×9 . . . . . . O9×9
... 19×9 . . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
O9×9 . . . . . . O9×9

.
Note that in our example, the penalty of using flow u8 is doubled since we want to discourage coupling. In general,
any route can be incentivised by adjusting penalties and this emphasizes the versatility of our approach. Furthermore,
in Table 1 the following additional simulation parameters are defined: Time step δ t, mean and standard deviation of
initial states σ˜0 and µ˜0, and lastly, mean and standard deviation of demand at sink nodes 3 and 4 σ˜3,4 and µ˜3,4. The
multi-population considered allows the simulation algorithm to be initialized with different initial conditions and also
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Table 1: Simulation parameters and their respective values.
Parameter δ t σ˜0 µ˜0 µ˜3 µ˜4 σ˜3 σ˜4
Value 0.1 15 40 23 7 1 1
allows to accommodate different realizations of the wait and see variables. We use the parameters determined as input
for the following simulation algorithm by which we compute the states of each agent over time. In Figures 3, 4, and 5 is
Algorithm 1 Simulation algorithm
1: Define simulation parameters according to Table 1
2: Define input matrices and vectors ω , f˜1, f˜2, Q˜1, Q˜2, BI , A, Q, B and scalar R.
3: Compute initial state x0
4: Initialize matrices ρ , v∗, ω , and C
5: Solve the continuous time Riccati equation with A,B,Q,R for Φ
6: Compute Als matrix for solving the system of linear equations for H
7: for Every time instance do
8: for Every agent do
9: Compute average state of neighbors ρ
10: Compute demand ω by the random normal distribution
11: Compute vector C with new vector ω
12: Compute Bls vector for solving the system of linear equations for H
13: Solve for H
14: Compute optimal control v∗
15: Compute new state xt+1
16: end for
17: end for
depicted how the states of the capacities evolve over time for all agents. Figure 3 shows a simulation when the penalty
on control equals the penalty on state deviation, i.e., Q = R = 1. Figure 4 presents a simulation of the mean-field game
where the penalty on state deviation is increased, implying Q = 10, R = 1. Contrarily, the results of a mean-field game
simulation with Q = 1, R = 10 can be found in Figure 5.
By setting the penalty on state deviation sufficiently high as was done in the simulation of Figure 4, the converged
states approximate each other to a larger extent compared to the case of equal Q and R because in this case the system
is penalized more if states deviate from objective ρk.
Conversely, by setting the penalty on control sufficiently high, convergence is obtained quicker in comparison to the
simulation with equal Q and R. In this situation, the system is penalized more to make adjustments, i.e. control, hence
the thinner lines in the converged region. Another observation is that, in this case, the best strategy to pursue the
14
Figure 3: Simulation of the mean-field game with Q = R = 1.
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Figure 4: Simulation of the mean-field game with Q = 10, R = 1.
16
Figure 5: Simulation of the mean-field game with Q = 1, R = 10.
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minimization problem is to choose a different solution compared to the simulations of Figures 3 and 4.
7 Concluding Remarks and Future Work
In this paper, we pursued optimization with primal-dual dynamics within a mean-field game. We did that by creating
a network of agents with scale-free topology over which agents participating in the mean-field game communicate
regarding their mean-field objectives. Results were developed on the dynamics of the mean-field game in the first,
while in the second theorem the existence of a mean-field equilibrium within the mean-field game was elaborated. In
addition to this, a numerical study was conducted in the form of a simulation of the mean-field game. What was found
is that consensus is obtained in cases when the penalties on state deviation and control are equal, and in cases where
both penalties differ significantly from each other.
Suggestions for future work can be found in the exploration of similar dynamics, however taking different net-
work topologies into account. Also, mean-field dynamics with implemented (online) forecasting algorithms based on
regression learning models will be considered [5, 7].
A Proof of Lemma 5.1
To prove the optimal control condition as provided in (13), we firstly need to write the Hamiltonian.
H (x,∂xσTk ,mk) =
infv
{
1
2 v
T Rv+ 12 (ρk− x)T Q(ρk− x)
+∂xσTk (Ax+Bv+C)
}
.
(22)
Then differentiating with respect to v gives:
Rv+BT∂xσk(x, t) = 0.
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Solving for v yields the expression for v∗k from (13). Given the fact that we do not consider disturbances for now, the
Hamiltonian gives us the robust mean-field dynamics:

∂tσk(x, t)+H(x,∂xσk(x, t),mk) = 0 ∈ R,
σk(x,T ) = 12 (ρk− x)T S(ρk− x) ∈ R,
∂tmk +∂x(mt∂pH(x,∂xσk(x, t),mk) = 0 ∈ R,
mk(x,0) = mk0 ∈ R.
(23)
mk(x,0) and σk(x,T ) are derived from the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation. Note that the system of equations above
contains two coupled partial differential equations (PDEs). Now substituting the optimal value for vk, termed v∗k , in the
Hamiltonian, we obtain:
H (x,σk(x, t),mk) =
=
1
2
[
xT Qx+ v∗
T
k Rv
∗
k
]
+(∂xσk(x, t))T (Ax+Bv∗k +C)
=− 1
2
(∂xσk(x, t))T
[
BR−1BT
]
∂xσk(x, t)
+(∂xσk(x, t))T (Ax+C)+
1
2
(ρk− x)T Q(ρk− x).
(24)
Using this expression for the Hamiltonian in (23), we obtain the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation in (12). Continuing
the proof, the third equation from (12) can be obtained by substituting optimal control (13) in (23). This concludes the
proof. 
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B Proof of Theorem 1
We start the proof by isolating the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman part with fixed ρk from (12) and we obtain:
∂tσk(x, t)− 12 (∂xσk(x, t))T
[
BR−1BT
]
∂xσk(x, t)
+(∂xσk(x, t))T (Ax+C)
+ 12 (ρk− x)T Q(ρk− x) = 0
∈ R× [0,T [,
σk(x,T ) = ψ(ρk(T ),x) ∈ R.
(25)
Now consider the following value function:
σk(x, t) =
1
2
xTΦ(t)x+H(t)T x+χ(t). (26)
Then (25) is rewritten as follows:
1
2 x
T Φ˙(t)x+ H˙(t)T x+ χ˙(t)
− 12
[
Φ(t)T x+H(t)
]T [BR−1BT ][Φ(t)T x+H(t)]
+
[
Φ(t)T x+H(t)
]T
(Ax+C)
+ 12 (ρk− x)T Q(ρk− x) = 0 ∈ R× [0,T [.
(27)
Since the equation above is an identity in x it reduces to the following set of three equations:

Φ˙(t)+ATΦ(t)+ΦT
[−BR−1BT ]Φ(t)+Q = 0
∈ [0,T [, Φ(T ) = S,
H˙(t)−2Φ(t)BR−1BT H(t)+AT H(t)
+Φ(t)TC−Qρk(t) = 0 ∈ [0,T [,
H(T ) =−Sρk(T ),
χ˙+H(t)T
[
BR−1BT
]
H(t)+H(t)TC
+
1
2
ρk(t)T Qρk(t) = 0 ∈ [0,T [, χ(T ) = 12ρ
2
k (T )S.
(28)
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Furthermore, the optimal control is given by:
v∗k =−R−1BT (Φ(t)T x+H(t)). (29)
The existence of a solution for (28) is assured by the standard convexity-concavity assumptions, which justifies the
choice for the quadratic value function [27].
Lastly, we average the expression for optimal control and by substitution in ddt mk(t) = Amk +Bv
∗
k +C, we obtain
the expression
m˙k(t) =
[
A−BR−1BTΦ(t)]mk(t)−BR−1BT H(t)+C, (30)
which is the second equation from (17). Now considering the stationary case with T → ∞, we obtain the following
set of equations:
ATΦ+ΦT
[−BR−1BT ]Φ+Q = 0,
−2ΦBR−1BT H +AT H +ΦTC−Qρk = 0,
HT
[
BR−1BT
]
H +HTC+
1
2
ρTk Qρk = 0.
Solving for H yields the following expression:
H =
[
AT −2ΦBR−1BT ]−1 [Qρk−ΦTC] . (31)
We now substitute (31) in (29) and we obtain:
v∗k =−R−1BT
(
ΦT x
+
[
AT −2ΦBR−1BT ]−1 [Qρk−ΦTC]). (32)
Note that the last term of (32) contains inverse of a sum of matrices. We may use Woodbury’s matrix identity for
rewriting purposes [15]. However, this results in an even longer expression. For simplification purposes, we perform
the substitution [
AT −2ΦBR−1BT ]−1 := Z˜.
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As a result, (32) can be rewritten as:
v∗k =−R−1BT
(
ΦT x+ Z˜
[
Qρk−ΦTC
])
=−R−1BT
(
ΦT x− Z˜ΦTC+ Z˜Qρk
)
.
(33)
Averaging over population k we obtain that the mean state evolves according to
v¯∗k =−R−1BT
(
ΦT mk− Z˜ΦTC+ Z˜Qρk
)
.
This implies that local the interaction of neighbors consists of local averaging and local adjustment.
m˙k(t) = Amk(t)
−BR−1BT
(
ΦT mk− Z˜ΦTC+ Z˜Qρk
)
+C
= Amk(t)+BR−1BT
(
ΦT (ρk−mk)+ Z˜ΦTC
+(−Z˜Q−ΦT )ρk
)
+C
= Amk(t)+BR−1BTΦT (ρk−mk)
+BR−1BT
(
Z˜ΦTC+(−Z˜Q−ΦT )ρk
)
+C.
(34)
Isolating the dynamics for the here and now c vector components we obtain
m˙ck(t) =−Q˜1mck(t)+R−1c ΦTc (ρkc −mck)
+R−1c
(
Z˜cΦTc µ+(−Z˜cQc−ΦTc )ρkc
)
+(µ− f˜1).
(35)
For all aggregate states mc =
(
mc1,m
c
2, . . . ,m
c
p
)
, we have the following consensus-type dynamics:
m˙c =−Q˜1mc(t)−Lmc(t)+δ . (36)
Here, Q˜1 := diag(Q˜1) (diagonal matrix with block entry Q˜1), δ := R−1c
(
Z˜cΦTc µ+(−Z˜cQc−ΦTc )ρkc
)
+(µ− f˜1) and
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L is defined as the graph-Laplacian matrix where the k jth entry is the block matrix:
Lk j =

R−1c ΦTc j = k,
1
|N(k)|R
−1
c ΦTc j 6= k, j ∈ N(k),
0 otherwise.
(37)
This concludes the proof of Theorem 5.1. 
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